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27 
FORMALISM IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
THEORY 
Cass R. Sunstein* 
In law, what does it mean to “interpret” a text, including the 
Constitution? There are some things that cannot be counted as 
interpretation. If a judge engages in freestanding moral theory 
and ignores the text, she is not interpreting it. If she reads it 
backwards, and tries to make sense out of it that way, she is 
probably making some kind of joke. At the same time, there is 
nothing that interpretation just is. Some people think that it is best 
to follow intended meaning. Others are committed to the original 
public meaning. Others favor some kind of moral reading—an 
idea that can itself take multiple forms, and that on certain 
assumptions might even entail use of intended meaning or 
original public meaning. The choice among plausible accounts of 
interpretation requires people to resort to their own arguments, 
external to the text, typically in the form of claims about what will 
make a constitutional order better rather than worse.1 
In response to an essay of mine on this topic, Richard Ekins 
has produced nearly ten thousand words on interpretation, largely 
in defense of his claim that interpretation just is an effort to 
uncover intended meaning.2 Ekins has obviously thought long and 
hard about this topic, and his essay bristles with both intelligence 
and learning. Moreover, his view is shared by other intelligent 
people. But in my view, Ekins is making a simple error, which is 
to try to resolve difficult questions in legal theory with a language 
 
 * Robert Walmsley University Professor, Harvard University. I am grateful to the 
Behavioral Economics and Public Policy Program at Harvard Law School for support, and 
to Dale Carpenter, Eric Posner, Samantha Power, and Adrian Vermeule for valuable 
comments on an early draft. 
 1. See Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U L. REV. 74 (2000), for a 
superb discussion of interpretive choice. 
 2. Richard Ekins, Objects of Interpretation, 31 CONST. COMMENT. 1 (2016) 
(replying to Cass R. Sunstein, There Is Nothing That Interpretation Just Is, 30 CONST. 
COMMENT. 193 (2015)). 
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lesson. Long ago, H.L.A. discussed this error under the name of 
formalism, and I think that Elkin is engaged in that kind of 
formalism here.3 
A few examples, taken from familiar disputes about 
particular constitutional provisions: Do affirmative action 
programs run afoul of the constitutional commitment to “equal 
protection”? Do bans on commercial advertising violate the 
protection of “freedom of speech”? Does the grant of “executive 
power” to the president forbid the creation of independent 
regulatory agencies? In each of these cases, it is certainly possible 
to offer an understanding of these terms that produces a “yes” 
answer. But that understanding is not compulsory. Speakers of 
the English language need not accept it.4 (I expect that Ekins 
would agree on that count.) 
The word “interpretation” is analogous, certainly in the 
context of constitutional law. I have noted that there are some 
things that cannot count as interpretation, but the term itself does 
not permit us to choose among radically different understandings, 
and it does not require us to settle on intended meaning. I confess 
that I am deeply puzzled that anyone could think otherwise. 
Ronald Dworkin has offered a sustained account of 
interpretation, suggesting that it is an effort to offer the best 
constructive account of the relevant materials in law (and 
elsewhere).5 Dworkin may be wrong on some things, or on many 
things, but the English language hardly rules his view out of 
bounds. When he rejects an account of interpretation akin to that 
defended by Ekins, he is not displaying confusion about the 
meaning of words. He has not failed to understand the meaning 
of the word “interpretation.” 
The overwhelming majority of members of the Supreme 
Court, now and throughout history, do not interpret the 
 
 3. H.L.A HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1965). It is possible, however, to identify 
a kind of formalism that insists on following the actual or plain meaning of texts, and that 
does not claim, wrongly, that vague or ambiguous texts have a single meaning. Uses of 
actual or plain meaning raise their own questions, but that is not my topic here. For a 
valuable discussion, see William Baude & Ryan David Doerfler, The (Not So) Plain 
Meaning Rule, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2805431. 
 4. I am bracketing here questions about the role of history and original 
understandings. 
 5. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1985). 
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Constitution by attempting to ascertain intended meaning.6 (The 
same is true in many other nations.) Those who reject intended 
meaning have diverse accounts of interpretation, and some are 
better than others. But when a judge rejects intended meaning, 
and nonetheless struggles hard over how to interpret words like 
“equal protection” or “due process of law,” it is unhelpful—a kind 
of stipulation, an effort to declare victory without doing the 
(normative) work required to earn it—to say that they are no 
longer engaged in the enterprise of interpretation. It is, in short, a 
species of formalism in the sense that I am using the term. 
Some clichés bear repeating: The meaning of words depends 
on their use. In law—and I think in many other social activities, 
including music, art, and literature—reasonable people can and 
do argue over the best conception of interpretation. Intended 
meaning is unquestionably one candidate, but there are others. To 
choose among the plausible candidates, judges and lawyers need 
normative criteria external to texts, and it is hardly sufficient to 
investigate interpretation as a social practice (in, for example, 
ordinary conversations). It is necessary to think about the world 
and to look outward, rather than to pretend that definitions can 
solve the problem. 
 
 
 6. I am putting to one side the relationship between “common law constitutional 
law” and interpretation. See DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010). 
